Trump's Stronger than he was in 2016

Why I think he's heading back to the White House

Source - Matt Goodwin 15/03/24

Eight years ago I was one of only a few analysts who put their neck out by predicting not only would Britain vote to leave the European Union but that also, a few months later, America would elect President Donald Trump.

This flew in the face of much that was written at the time. In fact, I vividly recall giving talks in Berlin, Frankfurt and Paris, during the spring of 2016, and literally being laughed out of the room. People thought I was insane.

I predicted these things not because they reflected my preferences—contrary to popular misconception I did not campaign for Brexit, though I did accept the result and argued we should see it through—but because I thought an insular ruling class and commentariat were losing touch with the mood outside their own class.

As I wrote between the Brexit and Trump revolts in Politico Magazine:

“The Brexit vote is a powerful reminder not only of how identity can trump economics but how supporters of populist insurgents are more loyal than many people think. While the pro-EU side focused relentlessly on dry arguments about jobs, wages and economic self-interest, Brexit was pushed over the line by a campaign that tapped into an intense cultural angst among blue-collar, left behind and older voters. The core message of “Take Back Control” resonated strongly among these voters who had long felt cut adrift from mainstream politics and under threat from rapid ethnic change … Presented with an opportunity to reassert their conservative values and disdain for a liberal mainstream, they took it. The intense power of this identity angst should have been diagnosed given that ahead of the referendum most voters readily admitted to pollsters they would be willing to suffer an economic hit if, in turn, it meant they had greater control over borders and immigration. Political and media elites failed to diagnose the simmering anger and mistakenly believed that it could be soothed with appeals to rational choice.”

And I think much of this is still true today.

Over the last eight years, too many people in the elite class have worked overtime to either ignore this simmering anger over cultural issues or point to things which make elites feel better—Russia, social media, ‘misinformation’, MAGA extremists, etc.— but which do not come close to diagnosing what’s really driving these revolts.

Across Europe, for example, the ongoing failure of the elite class to respond to the 2016 revolts and what they represented —a desire for lower immigration, slower demographic change, stronger borders, institutions which represent a wider range of views in society, and a pushback against wokery and Islamist terror— is today reflected in ongoing support for national populist movements.

Only this week, in Portugal, the Chega! movement (translated as Enough!) became the latest national populist party to enjoy record results, watching its share of the vote rocket from just 1% in 2019 to more than 18%, making it the third largest party.

And this follows similar gains elsewhere, for national populist parties which also challenge the narrow elite consensus on immigration, refugees, Islam, and woke politics —Geert Wilders in the Netherlands, Georgia Meloni in Italy, Marine Le Pen in France, the Alternative for Germany, Vox in Spain, among many others.

The ongoing failure to address these concerns is also why, at elections across the EU this spring, Europe’s national populists are forecast to enjoy their strongest ever results. There is simply little if any evidence that liberals and the established parties have successfully responded to the grievances that were thrown onto the table in 2016. In fact, if anything they look more lost today than they were eight years ago.

And the story is much the same in America where, if you look at the latest polling, as I just did for a talk to financial investors, then you would surely conclude that Donald Trump is stronger today than he was in both 2016 and 2020.

In the national polls, Trump leads Joe Biden by an average of 2.1 points while in the crunch battleground states his leads are even more impressive —a 5.2 point lead for Trump in Arizona, 5.7 in Georgia, 5.6 in Nevada, 3.6 in Michigan.

Trump, furthermore, not only remains firmly anchored in the political realignment that swept him to power in 2016 —which saw him poll especially strongly among white men, people without degrees, and areas outside the big cities— but over the last eight years has also expanded and diversified his electorate.

While the Democrats, as I’ve already shown, have been losing support among non-Hispanic whites, non-graduates, and American men, Trump has been cementing his position among all these groups, relative to 2016.

Furthermore, while nationally Trump is more popular than at any point since he left office and enjoys rising support among white and black Americans, he has more than doubled his support among Latino and Hispanic voters over the last year —with 40% of these voters now thinking favourably of him.

As Nate Moore over at the Liberal Patriot notes:

“Hispanics now more closely resemble non-Hispanic whites than black Americans in their opinions of Trump, a sharp departure from when Trump was in the Oval Office. Polling—though still volatile this early—confirms new Hispanic enthusiasm for the former president. Biden barely leads, or even trails, Trump with Hispanic voters despite winning the group by 23 points four years ago.” 

And that’s not all.

Many other key polling metrics also appear more far more favourable for Trump than many commentators would like to admit.

Like the fact that, today, only 25% of Americans think their country is ‘heading in the right direction’, which is notably lower than the 40% figure that was recorded at the same point in 2020, shortly before Trump was defeated by Joe Biden.

Or that, today, only 38% of Americans say they approve of Joe Biden —which is well below the comparable figures for previous presidents at the same point in the cycle, as well as below Biden’s own rating at the same point in 2020.

Or that, if you really believe it’s ‘the economy stupid’, almost 60% of Americans say they disapprove of how Biden is handling the economy, which is their top priority.

Look too at how some of these numbers have changed since Biden came to office after defeating Trump four years ago.

Public approval of how Joe Biden’s handling the economy?

It’s collapsed from a net positive rating of +22 to a net negative rating of minus 17.

Public approval of how Joe Biden’s handling crime?

It’s collapsed from a net positive rating of +3 to a net negative rating of minus 18.

Public approval of how Joe Biden’s handling immigration?

It’s collapsed from a net positive rating of +14 to a net negative rating of minus 35.

In fact, it’s difficult to find an issue on which Joe Biden and the Democrats have a clear and consistent positive rating among ordinary Americans.

And, unlike four years ago, as the Pew Research Center has shown, many of the issues which play well for Trump, such as immigration and crime, have become much more salient today than they ever were in 2020.

Over the course of Joe Biden’s presidency, Americans concern about immigration has rocketed, with the share selecting ‘dealing with immigration’ as a priority surging from 39 to 57% among all Americans, and 39 to 76% among Republicans.

Over the same time frame, public concern over crime has also surged, with the share of Americans selecting it as a top priority rising from 47 to 58%, and then from 55 to 68% among Republican voters. It is this cluster of concerns over migration, borders, crime that will ultimately drive the Trump campaign.

And then comes what we might call the “age factor” —the fact that, whatever your views about Joe Biden, his cognitive ability and age look set to be a much more central factor in the 2024 campaign than they ever were four years ago.

And what do ordinary Americans think about it?

Well, if you look at the very latest polling from YouGov and The Economist, released this week, then it’s not good reading for the Biden camp.

More than half of all Americans —55%— think “Joe Biden’s health and age would severely limit his ability to do the job”, which jumps to 59% among independents. Only 27% of Americans and 28% of independents feel the same way about Trump.

Also significant in this respect is the fact that while 41% of Americans think Trump is ‘a weak leader’, when it comes to Joe Biden the figure rockets to 63%.

Don’t get me wrong.

Many Americans are deeply sceptical of Trump and would, overall, much rather be presented with a very different pair of candidates in November.

But if this election is going to come down to cognitive ability and age, which I suspect it will, then these numbers are another reason why Joe Biden is in trouble.

It seems to me, then, that Donald Trump is actually in a much stronger position than he was in both 2020 and 2016 —and is the clear favourite to win in November.

And much of this, in turn, takes us back to the continuing failure of the elite class to make sense of why so many people around the world are still rebelling against the narrow, stifling orthodoxy they are imposing on the rest of their societies.

Writing in The Wall Street Journal last week, the always insightful columnist Gerard Baker talked about this in terms of the left’s ongoing problem with hubris:

“Except for a few empathic souls, most Democrats have never really understood the former president’s appeal. They like to ascribe it, in their own words, to a “basket of deplorables,” “bitter clingers” or, in Mr. Biden’s characteristically less imaginative phrasing, “semifascists.” They gaze out from their Ivy League casements and Hollywood balconies on a Hobbesian hinterland of racists, bigots and fools, fed a diet of “misinformation” by right-wing media. From those secure perches they don’t see people who feel betrayed at home and abroad by successive leaders, American communities battling devastating health and financial crises, workers whose incomes have struggled to keep pace with costs, parents who fear their children’s lives will be worse—all told by a modern aristocracy that their American values are wicked, that people from other countries who have no legal right even to be here are entitled to the same privileges, even when they commit violent crimes”.

As Baker rightly notes, the common element in the left’s miscalculations about Trump —which, I would add, is just as visible in the European left’s reaction to national populists this side of the pond—is hubris, the absolute self-assurance that they alone, the Luxury Belief Class, know what is good for the rest of us.

Dismissive of ordinary people, ignorant of their values, concerns, and priorities, and too often sneering of their lifestyles and ways of life, the modern left remains just as out-of-touch and adrift from wider society as it was eight years ago.

And, come November, I suspect this may yet be why so many in the elite class will be forced to confront the stark and sobering conclusion they’ve been doing all they can ignore over the last eight years —they have still not addressed the underlying reasons why so many people today feel so utterly fed up with their political project.